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ABSTRACT
Zhang, Yanling. M. S., Department of Economics, Wright State University, 1999. 
Measurissg Health Care Micro-Economic Efficiency: A Case study of Massachusetts 
Hospital's Quality and Value Measurement with Risk Adjustment.
This report has four main parts: 1) Introduction: The healthcare phenomenon, 
considerations and economic implications; 2) A case study of measuring health care 
quality and value for methodology investigation; 3) conclusions and 4) policy 
implications. The principal aim of this report is to discuss methods of measuring micro- 
economic efficiency in healthcare. In the introduction, economic theories including 
elasticity, demand and supply, competition, market failure and so on are applied to 
healthcare. Next the role of this report is placed within the context of organization I 
worked for with a case study to show how to measure quality and value with risk 
adjustment related to the issues raised in the introduction. Conclusions are drawn from 
the case study, and limitations and other issues are raised for further study. The final 
section discusses policy implications. At the end of the report, reference articles and 
books are listed. And an appendix with the sample SAS (Statistical Analysis System) 
programming and outputs written and generated during the intern research period are also 
attached.
This internship was performed at CareGroup, an organized system of quality healthcare 
serving the individual, family, and community, which includes teaching hospitals for 
Harvard Medical School, located at Boston, Massachusetts.
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L Imtr®dffletkiK BfeaMl Care PSieiiomenffim9 Consideration 
and Eeomomk Implication
More than ever, we feel a sense of urgency to improve health care quality and value. 
Efficiency problems have significant economic implications and prompted this urgency. 
Health care is unlike most consumer goods. When you go shopping, you usually can 
compare the quality and price and then buy the one either with better quality or with 
lower price according to your preference. However, when you are sick and need to visit a 
doctor, it seems that you have no choice or you never think about making choices. You 
just make an appointment to visit your primary-care physician. The vast majority of 
patients lack the information necessary for informed choice. This information failure is 
one of the characteristics of the health market. This information failure is one of the 
characteristics of the health market. Hence, patients are compelled to delegate, to varying 
degrees, treatment decisions to medical professionals who also supply the services 
demanded -creating a potential conflict of interest. Even within the medical profession, 
there are pervasive uncertainties about treatment options and consequences. For example, 
an experienced doctor is used to prescribing the medicine with which he/she is familiar 
when faced with a patient with a certain diagnosis, although there are many newly 
released medicines of lessor prices and maybe more effective. Another example is that an 
emergency doctor trained from a certain medical school is taught to do a radiology scan 
on the patients who came to the emergency room with a complaint of ankle pain. This
may be justified, but it inevitably causes higher costs to those who do not have ankle 
fractures. This suggests considerable variability in accepted medical practice.
Another issue we need to consider is the problem of moral hazard. On the demand side, 
this may be reflected in an increase in the demand for covered health care because 
patients do not face the full marginal cost. But moral hazard is not limited to demand. 
On the supply side, for example, the incentive to over-supply medical services may be 
heightened when a third party (insurance company) pays the bulk of any services that 
doctors choose to provide. These effects may be strongest under fee-for-service payment 
arrangements.
These are the efficiency issues. In health care, microeconomic efficiency emphasizes that 
quality of care and consumer satisfaction should be maximized at minimum cost. Micro- 
efficiency has two aspects: productive efficiency associated with producing a fixed set of 
services at minimum cost; and effectiveness, defined as maximizing services provided for 
a fixed set of inputs or maximizing the impact on health goals, defined as the length and 
quality of life. Costs ought to include administrative expenses. Micro-efficiency also 
requires taking into account “spill-over” effects (e.g., due to communicable diseases and 
productivity-related effects on the labor force). Dynamic efficiency considerations 
include searching for organizational forms and technological advances that improve the 
productivity of health resources. More broadly, in assessing the most efficient ways to 
improve health “outcomes”(or health status), governments need to consider whether 
increased resources channeled into mainstream health services are not draining resources
from other, more effective, programs. These could include, for example, housing, 
education, income maintenance, and nutrition and hygiene programs, all of which could 
influence the population’s health1. Alain Enthoven (1988) makes this point nicely, 
writing, “ An efficient allocation of health care resources to and within the health care 
sector is one that minimizes the social cost of illness, including its treatment. This is 
achieved when the marginal dollar spent on health care produces the same value to 
society as the marginal dollar spent on education, defense, personal consumption, and 
other uses. Relevant costs include the suffering and inconvenience of patients, as well as 
the resources used in producing health care. This goal should not be confused with 
minimizing or containing health care expenditures. Policy makers focus much attention 
on the total amount of spending on health care services, often as a share of gross national 
product (GNP). But, a lower percentage of GNP spent on health care does not necessarily 
mean greater efficiency. If the reduced share of GNP is achieved by denial or 
postponement of services that consumers would value at more than their marginal cost, 
then efficiency is not achieved or enhanced by the cut in spending”(p. 11).2
From hospital perspective, they are faced with an environment of growing competition, 
changing payment mechanisms, and consolidation. These factors and others challenge 
hospital executives to respond with better quality and value management. Hospitals face 
growing challenges to maintain or expand their share of a decreasing market by achieving 
these capabilities. By not responding to the changes, they risk their very survival to an
' Howard Oxley and Maitland MacFarlan: "Health Care Reform Controlling Spending and Increasing 
Efficiency".
acquisition or merger. Hospitals also have objectives common to other businesses. For 
example, they must remain profitable in order to serve their communities effectively and 
to embrace capital markets for plant and technology modernization. The services they 
deliver must be of high quality to attract and retain customers in a competitive 
marketplace. Finally, they have significant human resource and management systems 
issues to address.
Given these changes, it is more critical than ever for hospitals to examine their 
environment — today and projected into the future — and to plan courses of action to 
ensure their survival. For some hospitals, the competitive marketplace has caused major 
problems. Their ability to react has been severely constrained by antiquated management 
structures and information systems. This has forced them into a position of reaction 
instead of proaction —making it difficult for them to improve their market, operational, or 
financial position. However, a growing number of hospitals are taking aggressive and 
innovative postures in the health care marketplace. These hospitals are developing 
effective management and information structures to secure their positions, today and 
tomorrow. A key feature of these new management and information structures is an 
enhanced ability to manage hospital costs.
Before the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) and the influx of fixed-price 
payment schemes, hospitals were more concerned with increasing revenues. Since many 
insurers paid published charges and Medicare reimbursed hospitals based on costs, the
2 Thomas Rice: "The Economics o f Health Reconsidered".
cost of operations was of secondary concern. However, in order to retain or increase their 
profitability levels today, providers need to focus on the cost of operations to manage 
their profitability—revenue and cost of operations. The key issue here is the quality 
measurement and reporting. In the March 1998 report to the President, the Advisory 
Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry noted that 
substantial work is required to develop and refine measures of health care quality. In 
Chapter 4 "Advancing Quality Measurement and Reporting" of part II "Establishing 
Health Care Quality as a National Priority", the report pointed that:" Establishing national 
aims for improvement alone will not lead to better quality health care. Standardized 
measures of quality are needed to track the health-care industry's progress in reaching the 
aims established for the Nation and to guide public health planning and policy making. 
Comparative information on quality also is needed for individual consumers, group 
purchasers, and others to use in selecting health care providers and health plans. 
Furthermore, valid and stable quality measures are integral to health plans' and providers’ 
efforts to improve performance, and, when standardized, encourage health care 
organizations to learn from each other through a process of benchmarking.
Despite a growing number of efforts to measure and report on health-care quality, useful 
information is neither uniformly nor widely available. Improving our ability to measure 
quality has been the object of significant public and private sector activity over the last 
decade, reflecting the expectation that measurement can serve both as a catalyst and a tool 
for improvement. While considerable advancements have been made in the quality- 
measurement field in recent years, current efforts fall short of fully meeting users' needs,
and often are duplicative and unduly burdensome on health care providers, plans, and 
others.3 At C-areGroup Center for Quality and Value, we are conducting path-breaking 
research to devise new and creative quality measures and cost management. In another 
words, we are measuring health care microeconomic efficiency. Hospitals are 
experiencing financial difficulties; insurance companies are losing money; doctors are 
complaining the insurance companies are controlling too much of the freedom of care 
they provide to patients. Patients are complaining that there are not enough spending on 
them. Where does all the money go? What is the bottleneck to prevent from efficiency? 
Efficiency is hard to measure.
The principal aim of this paper is to discuss microeconomic efficiency using a method 
that measures the spending with risk adjustment for the managed care population for 
CareGroup hospitals in the physician performance measurement profile project. These 
projects involve investigation of methods to improve health-care quality and value. These 
methods will have a significant impact on health-care policy making and improvement. 
Thus, they will also have impact on the economy since health care is a large part of our 
economy.
3 http://www.hcqualitycommission.gov/fmal/chap04.html
II. Case Study ©ff Me&surimg Mealtto Care QuiaMty ami Value
Phym&an P®rfmmarn&§ Pmfile with Risk adjustment
w3@als
The purpose of this profile is to develop a set of provider profiles for physicians 
throughout the CareGroup health care network. These profiles will be used to guide the 
behavior of clinicians and the decisions of practice groups, to identify and promote the 
use of best practices. In order to achieve meaningful comparisons of outcomes across 
groups of patients, I will perform risk adjustment using the Diagnostic Cost Groups- 
Hierarchical Condition Category (DCG-HCC) methodology on assessments of resource 
consumption and relative resource needs of patients across CareGroup's risk units for 
CareGroup and Primary Care Physicians of Provider Service Network (PSN).
Background
Comparing outcomes is now central to changing the American health care delivery system 
and responding to competitive market forces. Patients' outcomes are compared across 
hospitals, groups of doctors (e.g., group practices, multi-specialty clinics), individual 
doctors, or health plans (e.g., health maintenance organizations, managed care companies). 
The comparisons are variously called performance or practice profiles, report cards, 
scorecards, and outcomes reports. As Dr. Dennis S. O'Leary, 1993 President of Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations said, “Report card day is
coming in the health care world". Methods for producing profiles generate considerable 
controversy and raise numerous challenging conceptual and statistical questions.4 Different 
hospitals and doctors see different types of patients. Many factors produce these 
differences, ranging from patients' individual health needs (e.g., acuity and severity of 
illness) to financial considerations to geographic location to patients' preferences and 
expectations. These differences have consequences. Most importantly, patients with 
complex illnesses, multiple coexisting diseases, significant disabilities, and other important 
risk factors are generally more costly and likely to do poorly, even with the best care, than 
healthy persons. Patients' outcomes and resource needs vary, sometimes widely, across 
doctors and hospitals.
For examining resource consumption (e.g., use of captivated dollars), risk adjustment aims 
to account for the higher costs of treating sick and disabled patients. Here, "risk" relates to 
expected costs for a period of care, and "risk adjustment" means adjusting assessments of 
resource use to reflect different levels of risk. For example, risk adjustment recognizes that 
patients with lung cancer typically generate higher costs than do patients with hypertension. 
Adjusting for the financial risks posed by varying health status should make physicians and 
hospitals more willing to accept chronically ill persons, fostering high-quality care across 
the spectrum of disease and disability.
4 Goldfield, N. and P. Boland, Eds. 1996 "Physician Profiling and Risk Adjustment" Gaithersburg, MD: 
Aspen Publishers, Inc.
For performance measurement, risk adjustment assumes that outcomes result from complex 
interactions among various treatments, patient characteristics affecting response to 
treatment, physician characteristics, quality of care, and random chance. Risk adjustment 
controls for intrinsic patient characteristics, facilitating judgments about relative quality 
when comparing outcomes across providers. Thus, residual differences in patient outcomes 
across providers may reflect quality.
Methods for Risk Adpjstm@rut t© Compare Cost Utilization
In most profiles, utilization and expenditure are compared among risk units or physicians. 
However, sicker patients tend to consume more resources than healthy patients who only 
have physical examinations each year. Many health plans, including Medicare, adjust for 
risk using primarily age and sex. Age and sex adjustment alone, however, explains only 
about 1% of differences in annual resource consumption across patients.
Efforts to adjust risk using more clinical information are hampered by limitations of 
available information. Clinical data on disease severity and patients' physical functioning 
are not available. Therefore, the only current option for risk adjustment across panels of 
patients uses diagnostic data from claims and encounter records submitted by physicians 
and hospitals. While several methods exist for diagnosis-based risk adjustment, one of the 
leaders is the Diagnostic Cost Groups (DCGs). A version of the DCGs, the Principal In- 
Patient DCGs (or PIP-DCGs) has been selected by the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) as the method they will implement for risk adjusting Medicare 
capitation payments starting January 1, 2000.
D®serip4ion ©tf ftlh<§ DC'Ss
The Diagnostic Cost Groups Hierarchical Condition Categories (DCGs-HCCs) are among 
several models for predicting future costs first developed under contract to HCFA by 
investigators at Boston and Brandeis Universities in the mid-1980s. Early DCG methods 
were hampered by using only inpatient Medicare claims, such as the PIP-DCGs mentioned 
above. Afterwards, the DCGs-HCCs were created, using ambulatory and inpatient 
encounter records for Medicare beneficiaries. Developers used three data sets: a commercial 
database representing 1.4 million persons with private insurance indemnity and HMO 
records from 200,000 Massachusetts state employees, and data on 1 million Michigan 
Medicaid recipients.
For the CareGroup analyses, we use a version of the DCGs-HCCs developed explicitly for 
working-age adults and families. To derive the DCGs-HCCs, we need to feed in 2 final big 
datasets, the diagnosis file and persons file. First the diagnosis file is derived from the 
claims data from 3 payers (Blue Cross Blue Shield, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care and Tufts 
Health Plan). The persons file is from the eligibility tables from the above-mentioned 
payers. The DxCG software designed by the DxCG company will use the 2 main files we 
input and the macro derived from the regression model to assign diagnosis codes to 543 
mutually exclusive "diagnostic groups," aiming to create clinically coherent categories with
adequate sample sizes. Based on regression analyses and clinical judgment, these 
"diagnostic groups" collapsed into 136 condition categories, which are then used to predict 
expected costs. Hierarchies within conditions aim to prevent additional diagnoses, within 
related conditions, from adding to cost predictions. Thus, the DCG-HCCs assign each 
person a "risk score" based on the combined effect of age, sex, and all diagnoses reported 
within the last year on inpatient and outpatient claims. "Risk scores" indicate the predicted 
costliness of people compared to a CareGroup sample population average of 1,0. For 
example, a "risk score" of 1.5 indicates 50% higher predicted costs than average. To 
examine the "risk" associated with a particular hospital or physician group, the risk scores 
across all patients for that provider are added, then divided by the number of patients. This 
produces an average risk score that can be compared to average scores for other groups.
Models and Variants: The DxCG program implements three DCG regression model 
variants distinguished by the information used to make predictions and the way in which the 
information is used:
Age-sex models use age and sex demographic information only. These models use more 
traditional measures of risk assessment and are meant to serve as a base line to the other 
DCG models for comparative purposes.
PIPDCG models use age, sex and principal inpatient or "PIP" diagnoses to classify an 
individual according to the single most significant medical problem detected. "Most 
significant" means having the highest future cost implications. Secondary diagnosis codes 
appearing on impatient claims are not used in these models as are diagnoses appearing on
physician and outpatient claims. PIPDCG models are fully hierarchical, single-condition 
models.
DCG/HCC models use age, sex and all diagnoses -both inpatient and outpatient -recorded 
on claims involving contact with clinically trained medical providers. Hierarchical 
Condition Categories (HCCs) are groupings of diagnostic codes based on clinical condition 
and expected resource. Hierarchies are imposed to assure that each individual receives 
credit for only the most costly of related condition categories. DCG/HCC models are 
multiple-condition models meaning that they recognize the cumulative effect of multiple 
problems.
According to numerous tests, both DCG/HCC and PIPDCG models predict annual resource 
use much better than age/sex models. In general, DCG/HCC models have higher predictive 
power than PIPDCG models. However, PIPDCG models have the advantage of 
significantly simpler data requirements (only inpatient hospital bills are required) and are 
generally less sensitive to diagnostic coding completeness than DCG/HCC models.
Required data input files consist of two files: The Diagnosis Input File contains all 
International Classification of Diseases 9th Revision Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) 
diagnoses, Current Procedural Terminology 4th revision (CPT-4) procedure codes, and 
expenditures recorded on "at-risk" claims from the managed-care claims files. Each of these 
quantities is associated with a unique enrollee. The Enrollment Input File contains age, sex, 
primary care physician and provider unit for all eligibles.
Time Periods: DCG models use information from the base year, or "Year 1", to generate 
predictions of resource use for two different one-year time periods: Prospective models use 
Year 1 diagnoses to predict Year 2 expenditures. They are sometimes called "payment" 
models because they can be used to set payment levels (capitation rates) on a prospective 
basis. Prospective DCG models emphasize measuring future expenditures resulting from 
chronic illness. They are particularly useful in measuring the extent of chronic illness 
burdens among enrollees in a health plan or patients treated by a group of providers. 
Concurrent models use Year 1 diagnoses to predict Year 1 expenditures. They are 
sometimes called "retrospective" or "profiling" models in that they offer a complete profile 
of the diagnoses receiving treatment within a population. They are often used to profile 
providers. Concurrent models predict better than prospective models because the same 
patient generates diagnosis codes in Year 1, simultaneously generate costs in Year 1.
Due to their greater explanatory power, concurrent models are more suitable for predicting 
expenditures for small groups of enrollees or patients, or when measuring acute health 
status. For example, concurrent models are useful when acute-care patients are triaged 
among providers according to severity of illness. In the CareGroup context, since we do not 
have enough claims data, we only use nine months of claims data for 1998.
Data populations: DCG models have been developed for three populations, reflecting the 
three major types of health insurance coverage in the United States:
The Medicare population, includes the aged (age 65 and over) and disabled (under age 65), 
and dual Medicare/Medicaid eligibles, but excluding End Stage Renal Disease enrollees.
The Medicaid population, includes children, pregnant women, disabled (SSI) and 
medically needy, but excluding Medicaid enrollees age 65 and over. The Commercial, 
privately insured under-age-65 population includes both children and adults. This 
population includes enrollees of Commercial insurance plans, Blue Cross; Blue Shield 
Plans, PPOs and self-insured employer sponsored plans.
Rjssearolh Progress to Date
We use the DCG-HCC methodology to examine resource consumption across "risk 
units"(hospitals) within CareGroup. We applied the DCG-HCC methodology to 1998 data 
from capitated Blue Cross/Blue Shield (BCBS) and Harvard Pilgrim Health Care (HPHC) 
and 1997 and 1998 data from the Tufts Health Plan. These analyses demonstrate that we 
can successfully apply the DCG-HCC approach to our insurance claims data and produce 
meaningful information. Several analyses have been done for Tufts, HPHC and Blue 
Cross payers stratified by time period of a half year, 9 months for 1998 current data 
(about 9 months), Jan.-June 98 and Tufts 1997 (12 months), and found that the risk scores 
do change as more claims add on. Compared with the first half year, BC seems have 
sicker patients, however, add the recent 3 months' claims data, Tufts' risk scores are 
higher than BC. Plus, the DxCG program is designed to require 12 months of claims data 
with payers updating their data daily. The decision to which payer have sicker patients 
should not be made before reviewing one year’s data. The analyses results do show that 
different providers within CareGroup had very different risk profiles based on the DCG- 
HCC risk assessments. The PSN leadership found that DCG-HCC-based assessments
about especially efficient versus inefficient risk units meet their prior expectations. We are 
applying these risk measurements to produce provider profiles, focus case management 
efforts, and refine disease-management projects.
The lengths of eligibility time are also tested for sensitivity purposes. Although they are 
designed to be sensitive at each individual level to determine the risk score, they are not 
designed to be sensitive if everyone has the same length of eligible time at risk at unit 
level. The program is required to default into 12 months, however using 6 or 9 months 
make no difference in the results of the risk scores for risk units when we use the 
snapshot eligibility tables and the eligible-months variable is not available. Later, when 
we created the eligible months from the historical eligibility tables, we learned that the 
risk scores are sensitive and should be weighted by the eligible months. For example, 
when you want to compare two doctors' patient's severity characteristics, the following 
formula is used to calculate each doctor's patients' risk score:
The doctor's risk score=[sum of (patients' risk score* eligible months)]/[sum of eligible 
months] .
Thus, the number of eligible patients and their number and degree of claims and also their 
eligible length of time determine the risk scores either by patients or by primary care 
physician or by risk units.
After all kinds of data cleaning and sensitivity testing, we performed several tests running 
the DCG-HCC model with the 3 payer’s input files respectively. We decided to combine 
the 3 payers for our CareGroup context as whole using the merged 1998-9 months claims
data and do the analyses by risk units and doctors for mainly three purposes: Physician 
performance profile risk adjustment for quality and cost improvement; case management; 
and disease management.
F M m g s  m 4  Appll€ato©Bi
Since the model can assign each patient a predicted risk score according to their age, sex 
and all claims of diagnosis and cost, the risk scores can help us to identify persons who 
will consume considerable resources in the future. This is essential to: (1) devising ways 
to rationalize and coordinate that care, presumably to improve overall quality; and (2) 
determining whether, in fact, expenditures could be reduced by better managing that care.
Predicting costly patients is hampered by the apparent randomness of many health care 
expenses: given a large population of patients, even the best statistical models could 
probably predict only about 25% of cost variations, due largely to the randomness of 
future resource needs. For example, one might be healthy today, generating few costs, 
but develop leukemia next year, precipitating high costs. There is virtually no way to 
predict exactly who will develop that leukemia.
Thus the hospital policy makers would like to see the risk adjusted profile for each 
hospital within CareGroup so that they can reallocate the resources. (See Appendix for 
detail). The report by hospital shows that the risk of medical expenditures differs 
substantially across CareGroup hospitals, indicating the need for risk adjustment. For
several hospitals, the diagnosis-based score differs significantly from the age/sex score, 
showing the value of diagnosis-based risk adjustment. The report presents the hospital 
policy makers the following information:
A. summary distribution of individuals and relative risk scores by hospitals;
B. distribution of individuals by age-sex groups and hospitals;
C. distribution of individuals by aggregated condition categories and hospitals;
D. distribution of individuals by condition categories and hospitals;
E. actual expenditures, predicted expenditures and efficiency indices by 
hospitals;
F. distribution of individual by diagnostic cost group.
After determining the risk score for each patient, we can also calculate the risk scores by 
the patients' primary care physician (PCP) to get the PCP's average risk score. In order to 
encourage doctors to accept sicker patients, who tend to utilize more resources, certain 
economic subsidies should be considered by the hospitals and payers according to the 
PCP's average risk scores. The scores can also be calculated by risk unit to get the 
average risk score in order to look at which hospital tends to attract sicker patients and 
which performed efficiently based on diagnoses and allocated.
We use the results to put in the physician's report cards for them to fully understand their 
patients and disease in order for them to provide more efficient and effective care. Here 
is the example we will deliver to the primary care physicians:
Report Card for Dr. XXXXXXXXX, License Number: 12435
Group: Health Care Associates 
Risk Unit: BIDPO 
Pod: 6
Summary:
Your panel size is 586 as compared with a BIDPO average of 407 and PSN Average Panel Size of 352.
On average, based on the diagnosis risk adjustment, the patients in your panel are predicted to be 3.2 times 
more costly than the average PSN panel. Your total costs were 130.52 per member per month as 
compared to a BIDPO average of 121.37 and a PSN average of 105.00 per member per month. Your 
average billing level is 3.2 as compared with a PSN average of 2.7.
Your patient management:
We have analyzed the claims experience o f your panel over the last year and have identified the most 
severally ill patients in your panel based on diagnosis and not on utilization. The top ten high-risk 
patients in your panel and the diagnoses are as follows:
KENNETH XXXXXXXXX Other Dermatological 15.41 $1,181
Moderate Cost Neurological
Minor Symptoms, Signs, Findings






URSULA XXXXXXX)(X Minor Symptoms, Signs, Findings 12.85 $678
History of Disease













Iron Deficiency and Other Anemias
Moderate Cost Neurological
* Minor Symptoms, Signs, Findings
Other Infectious Disease
Other Endocrine, Metabolic, Nutritional
PAUL xxxxxxxxx Valvular and Rheumatic Heart Disease 7.88 $1,847
Moderate Cost Congenital
Screening/Observation/Special Exams

















High Cost Ear, Nose, and Throat
ERNST xxxxxxxxx High Cost Cancer 6.38 $73




Low Cost Ear, Nose, and Throat
Other Infectious Disease
Other Injuries and Poisonings
Low Cost Gastrointestinal
Iron Deficiency and Other Anemias
Minor Symptoms, Signs, Findings
LINDA xxxxxxxxx Other Musculoskeletal/Connective Tiss 5.24 $1,307
Benign Neoplasm
Other Urinary System












Minor Symptoms, Signs, Findings
KATHY xxxxxxxxx Low Cost Genital 4.42 $1,475
History of Disease
Low Cost Cerebrovascular Disease
Other Musculoskeletal/Connective Tiss
Other Endocrine, Metabolic, Nutritional








Other Endocrine, Metabolic, Nutritional
Other Injuries and Poisonings
For your disease management:
We have analyzed the claims experience of your panel over the last year and have identified the disease 
states which most likely to cause the greatest utilization in your panel. The following 10 disease states 
most severe and likely to cause utilization in your panel are:
D^aanosis Cojdioo^ Cataoofv : Ht-K Scwe : .# or f■Yhecr*
HIV/AIDS 15.41 1
Renal Failure 12.85 1
Blood/Immune Disorders 9.55 2
Iron Deficiency and Other Anemias 7.94 4
Moderate Cost Congenital 7.88 1
Congestive Heart Failure 7.88 1
High Cost Neurological 7.16 2
Moderate Cost Neurological 7.08 4
High Cost Acute Gastrointestinal 6.91 1
High Cost Cancer 6.38 1
Your utilization:
Based on the severity of illness of your patients, we have computed the predicted costs of managing your 
panel (mean CareGroup expense per patient/relative risk of your patients). Your predicted costs were 
120.27 per member per month, while your actual costs were 130.52. Thus your patients are utilizing 8% 
more services than expected, after adjusting for illness severity. Your utilization per member per month by 
category is as follows:
Your Practice BXDPG PSN
Radiology $8.00 $10.00 $9.00
Laboratory $3.00 $4.00 $3.50
Pharmacy $15.00 $12.00 $11.00
Office Visits $5.00 $4.00 $5.00
Inpatient Hospitalization $20.00 $25.00 $22.00
The above report card will not only help physicians have an overall picture of their 
patients and utilization but also help them organize their care to be more efficient and 
effective. Because when doctors have increased patient loads, it will be hard for them to 
keep track of each of them. Another advantage is that knowing about disease 
management helps them to choose in early intervention or prevention to avoid later 
greater cost. The report card can also help the hospital and payer executive to subsidize 
the doctors who see sicker patients and suffer from economic losses. Some doctors tend 
to argue that their patients are sicker before the risk adjustment explains their 
inefficiency. The risk adjustment based on their own patients’ diagnosis and 
demographic information will clarify those misunderstanding and help them to perform 
more efficiently.
Since CareGroup is an integrated healthcare delivery systems including eight hospitals 
(or called risk units) because each hospital bears the risks itself, comparison among these 
eight hospitals and efficient relocation of resources becomes very important for the
score can be assigned to see which hospital have sicker patients:
Table 2.1: Summary Comparisons Using DCG3 Model On the Full Sample 
Frequencies and Means for Benchmark & Current Sample
Saraci'a 
ma i i i




1,379,023 195,778 13,488 61,575 32,226 11,662 9,699 6,351 56,628 4,149
Percent of 
Sample
100.0 100.0 6.9 31.5 16.5 6.0 5.0 3.2 28.9 2.1
Relative Risk Scores
Normalized to Benchmark Sample
Age/Sex Model 1.00 1.02 0.33 1.21 1.04 0.79 1.04 1.05 0.99 1.21
Concurrent 
(Year 1) 1998
1.00 1.10 0.65 1.29 1.05 0.94 1.20 1.16 1.00 1.50
Prospective 
(Year 2) 1999
1.00 1.11 0.37 1.40 1.08 0.80 1.16 1.19 1.01 1.38
Relative Risk Scores
Normalized to Current Sampie
Age/Sex Model 1.00 0.33 1.19 1.02 0.77 1.02 1.03 0.97
Concurrent 
(Year 1) 1998
1.00 0.59 1.18 0.95 0.86 1.10 1.06 0.91 1.37
Prospective 
(Year 2) 1999
1.00 0.33 1.26 0.98 0.72 1.04 1.07 0.91 1.25
The above table shows each hospital's numbers of patients for 1998 and consists of the 
percent of overall CareGroup sample size. It also shows three different relative risk scores 
generated from the DxCG models- age/sex model, diagnostic cost group concurrent 
predict model and diagnostic cost group prospective predict model with comparison with 
national benchmark and normalized to CareGroup sample size. From the above table, we 
can see that RU2 hospital has the biggest population size among all the hospitals. 
CareGroup overall has a sicker population than the national benchmark population. 
Among CareGroup hospitals, RU8 has the sickest population, which may result in more 
resource utilization.
Demographics sometimes are correlated with the risks:
Table 2.2: Summary of Age and Sex
larychmarl? Total PJM RU2 RU3 RU4 RUS RU6 640? RU8
All Eligibles 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Female 52.9 53.5 48.1 56.0 53.8 52.6 49.4 44.8 53.8 55.3
Male 47.1 46.5 51.9 44.0 46.2 47.4 50.6 55.2 46.2 44.7
Child: Age 0 to 17 26.7 21.9 92.6 2.6 19.6 47.9 19.7 13.9 24.8 2.7
Young Adult: Age
18 to 44
45.0 49.9 7.3 61.3 51.3 33.2 48.5 57.1 48.8 59.6
Older Adult: Age
45 to 64
28.3 26.6 0.0 34.2 27.6 17.5 30.5 27.3 24.6 35.6
Senior: Age 65+ 0.0 1.6 0.0 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.8 1.9 2.0
Mean Age 31.8 33.1 8.7 39.8 33.8 24.3 34.5 35.4 32.1 40.0
RU8 hospital has the highest mean age and an older population, which is positively, 
correlated with its highest relative risk score. On the other hand, RU1, which is a 
children's hospital, has the youngest population and also has relatively low risk scores.
In order for the whole CareGroup to efficiently re-allocate resources, determining which 
hospital attracts what kinds of patients is the key. The following Diagnostic profile will 
help achieve this goal:




Total RU1 RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8
All Eligibles 195,: 13,488 61,575 32,226 11,662 9,699 6,351 56,628 4,149
No Claims or Valid 
Diagnosis in Sample
47,298 2,715 15,012 9,682 2,020 2,115 1,705 13,063 986
01: Infectious and 
Parasitic
16,190 2,076 4,296 1,847 1,532 681 517 4,969 272
02: Malignant 
Neoplasm




14,503 267 5,980 1,811 790 774 430 4,092 359
04: Diabetes 4,896 29 2,225 834 120 218 237 1,105 128
05: Nutritional, and 19,162 154 8,191 2,993 976 1,118 681 4,275 774
Metabolic.
06: Gastrointestinal 17,336 618 6,291 2,994 986 804 670 4,457 516
07: Musculoskelel 
and Connective Tiss.
28,620 603 10,315 4,619 1,307 1,634 1,033 8,155 954
08: Hematological 3,S 89 1,493 594 274 193 205 944 198
09: Mental 7,9 392 2,279 1,456 461 573 329 2,210 202
10: Mental 
Retardation
2 2 3 4 0 1 5 0
11: Neurological 6,649 176 2,379 999 348 427 205 1,912 203
12: Cardio- 
Respiratory Arrest
290 9 97 38 20 16 12 85 13
13: Heart 18,460 80 7,526 3,250 665 992 664 4,625 658
14: Cerebro-Vascular 632 11 209 115 33 35 14 200 15
15: Vascular 2,739 39 1,018 472 155 123 131 722 79
16: Lung 15,324 964 4,095 2,800 1,266 840 714 4,260 385
17: Eyes 13,722 713 4,808 2,054 839 740 442 3,812 314
18: Ears, Nose, and 
Throat
40,155 4,391 9,444 6,391 3,623 2,328 1,332 11,893 753
19: Urinary System 6,957 252 2,452 1,325 327 375 229 1,810 187
20: Genital System 18,169 219 7,054 3,091 724 963 555 5,121 442
21: Pregnancy- 
related
4,437 13 1,942 634 168 181 156 1,256 87
22: Skin and 
Subcutaneous




24,119 1,862 6,584 3,767 1,880 1,368 893 7,173 592
24: Symptoms, Signs 
and Ill-Defined Cond
42,804 2,134 14,539 6,580 2,616 2,390 1,423 11,859 1,263
25: Pediatric and 
Congenital Disorders
3,049 381 933 399 246 123 75 843 49
26: Neonates 1,955 304 517 247 145 74 45 596 27
27: Transplants, 
Openings, Other V- 
Codes
3,388 165 968 598 144 270 124 953 166
28:
Screening/History
75,056 7,857 21,796 9,657 5,801 3,621 1,669 23,615 1,040
29: Life Sustaining 
Procedure Based




421 10 128 48 33 27 22 138 15
Since the purpose of these profiles is to provide an efficiency comparison, efficiency 
indices by risk unit will be very helpful for hospital administrators:
Table 2.4: Actual & Predicted Expenditures and Efficiency Indices by Risk Unit 
-Weighted by Eligible Months
- Weiifl 71U3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8
Number of Eligible 
Years




$£. $469 $ $724 $834 $992 $916 $844 $1,223
Actual Expendifcw® S ssres Normalised to  Samp a fleam)
Concurrent (Yeai 
1 )1998
1.00 0.53 1.21 0.82 0.94 1.12 1.03 0.95 1.38
Relative Risk Scares (Normalized to Sample Mean)
Age/Sex Model 1.00 0.33 1.19 1.02 0.77 1.02 1.03 0.97 1.19
Concurrent Model 
(Year 1 j
1.00 0.59 1.18 0.95 0.86 1.10 1.06 0.91 1.37
Prospective Model 
(Year 2)
1.00 0.33 1.26 0.98 0.72 1.04 1.07 0.91 1.25
Risk Adjusted Expenditures (Actual 1Expenditures Divided by Relative Risk Scores)
Age/Sex Model $887 $1,421 $900 $710 $1,084 $973 $889 $870 $1,028
Concurrent Model 
(Year 1)
$887 $795 $908 $763 $970 $902 $864 $927 $893
Predicted Expend itures (Relative Risk Scores * Sample Mean)
Age/Sex Model $887 $293 $1,056 $905 $683 $905 $914 $860 $1,056
Concurrent Model 
(Year 1)
$887 $523 $1,047 $843 $763 $976 $940 $807 $1,215
Prospective Model 
(Year 2)
$1,593 $526 $2,007 $1,561 $1,147 $1,657 $1,705 $1,450 $1,991
Efficiency Index (Actual Expenditures Divided by PrelT-re H d.-;.
Age/Sex Model 1.00 1.60 1.01 0.80 1.22 1.10 1.00 0.98 1.16
Concurrent Model 
(Year 1)
1.00 0.90 1.02 0.86 1.09 1.02 0.97 1.05 1.01
The above table first shows the actual expenditure by risk units, then demonstrates the 
actual expenditure scores, which are each risk unit's actual expenditure divided by the 
CareGroup sample mean. The actual expenditure scores show the relative risk of each 
unit to the whole organization’s average, which is regardless of the patient population’s 
severity of sickness. The next row in the above table shows the relative risk score, which 
reflect the patient population's severity of sickness by risk units. The following row is the 
risk-adjusted expenditure, which is the actual expenditure divided by relative risk score. 
The following row is the predicted expenditure, which is the relative risk scores times the
CareGroup sample mean. These expenditures demonstrate the amount of money that 
should spent on a certain patient population taking its sickness into consideration. In the 
last row is the key point: the efficiency index, which is actual expenditures divided by 
predicted expenditures. The CareGroup sample mean is the benchmark, which is 1. 
Those who are less efficient are higher than 1; the lower the score, the more efficient the 
risk unit is.
After we know how efficient each risk unit is, we would also like to know the
distribution of the patient population's aggregated diagnostic cost group.
Table 2.5: Distribution by Aggregated DC® (AO>C«a)





Percent Percent Number Percent Mean 'cent
Total 100.0 100.0 195,776 100.0 $1,656 100.0
$0 to $999 76.0 12.8 136,408 69.7 $306 12.9
$1000 to 4999 17.3 27.0 45,112 23.0 $2,247 31.3
$5000 to 9999 4.1 19.3 8,804 4.5 $6,820 18.5
$10,000 to 24,999 2.0 21.0 4,233 2.2 $15,274 19.9
$25,000 or more 0.7 19.9 1,219 0.6 $46,328 17.4
Table 2.5 shows most of the patients (93%) have spending falling into the category 
between no cost and less than $10,000. Less than 7% of the patients have cost of $10,000 
or more. This can serve the purpose of case management which can capture those 5% of 
patients who spend 95% of the spending and provide better preventive care for these 
patients to save some spending so that can better serve other 95% patients.





Percent Percent Number Percent Mean Percent
Total 100.0 100.0 195,776 100.0 $1,656 100.0
$0 to $99 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 $0 0.0
$100 to 199 57.2 5.9 82,472 42.1 $152 3.9
$200 to 299 2.3 0.4 6,664 3.4 $236 0.5
$300 to 399 5.2 1.2 13,090 6.7 $344 1.4
$400 to 499 2.0 0.6 8,127 4.2 $468 1.2
$500 to 699 4.1 1.7 11,653 6.0 $604 2.2
$700 to 999 5.2 3.1 14,402 7.4 $853 3.8
$1000 to 1499 5.0 4.3 13,827 7.1 $1,245 5.3
$1500 to 1999 3.8 4.5 10,455 5.3 $1,747 5.6
$2000 to 2499 2.6 3.9 6,707 3.4 $2,253 4.7
$2500 to 2999 1.7 3.3 4,255 2.2 $2,769 3.6
$3000 to 3999 2.5 5.9 5,705 2.9 $3,539 6.2
$4000 to 4999 1.7 5.1 4,163 2.1 $4,512 5.8
$5000 to 5999 1.3 5.0 3,427 1.8 $5,515 5.8
$6000 to 7499 1.4 6.5 2,935 1.5 $6,775 6.1
$7500 to 9999 1.3 7.8 2,442 1.3 $8,704 6.6
$10,000 to 14,999 1.2 9.9 2,453 1.3 $12,595 9.5
$15,000 to 19,999 0.6 6.6 1,216 0.6 $17,358 6.5
$20,000 to 24,999 0.3 4.5 564 0.3 $22,435 3.9
$25,000 to 29,999 0.2 3.4 339 0.2 $27,671
$30,000 to 39,999 0.2 4.7 386 0.2 $34,523
$40,000 to 49,999 0.1 3.3 205 0.1 $44,895
$50,000 to 59,999 0.1 2.2 108 0.1 $55,457
$60,000 to 69,999 0.0 1.7 50 0.0 $65,847 1.0
$70,000 + 0.1 4.7 131 0.1 $116,658 ■; '
In order to determine the distributed among each risk unit within CareGroup, the 







Percent Total! RU1 RU2 RU3 fi«4 RU5 RU6 HUT RU8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
$0 to $999 76.0 69.7 82.9 65.1 71.3 71.8 67.1 67.4 71.7 58.0
$1000 to 4999 17.3 23.0 13.7 25.9 22.0 22.3 24.4 24.2 22.0 31.2
$5000 to 9999 4.1 4.5 2.1 5.4 4.2 3.7 5.4 5.4 4.0 6.8
$10,000 to 
24,999
2.0 2.2 1.0 2.8 1.8 1.7 2.3 2.5 1.9 3.2
$25,000 or
more
0.7 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.8
All the previous tables show the profile for the current year, but how about our next year's 
patient population? Can we predict their spending according to their chronicled 
conditions? The following tables tell us the story:
Table 2.8: Distribution by Aggregated DCG (ADCG)
Prospective BCG3 Model, Predicting 1999
Benchmark Current Sample




Percent Percent Number Percent Mean Percent
Total 100.0 100.0 195,776 100.0 $1,765 100.0
$0 to $999 48.4 14.6 82,559 42.2 $490 11.7
$1000 to 4999 46.6 54.0 101,247 51.7 $1,852 ■
$5000 to 9999 3.7 15.6 8,796 4.5 $6,554 16.7
$10,000 to 24,999 1.0 9.6 2,615 1.3 $15,593 11.8
$25,000 or more 0.3 6.2 559 0.3 $34,270 5.5
Table 2.8 shows the number of people in each expenditure category given their chronic 
condition. Other unpredicted injuries and disease will not be taken into consideration.
ProspeeHwe EC'S® Maid®!, (Predicting 1999
Benchmark emn-en! Sample
People D eters Pe@pS<& DeSlars
DCG Expenditure 
Range
Percent Percent Number Percent Mean Percent
Total 100.0 100.0 195,776 100.0 $1,765 100.0
$0 to $99 0.0 0.0 0.0 $0 0.0
$100 to 199 0.0 0.0 0.0 $0 0.0
$200 to 299 2.2 21,204 10.8 $267 1.6
$300 to 399 8.1 1.8 12,549 6.4 $339 1.2
$400 to 499 8.0 2.4 9,792 5.0 $472 1.3
$500 to 699 11.4 4.3 23,062 11.8 $586 3.9
$700 to 999 7.8 3.9 15,952 8.2 $779 3.6
$1000 to 1499 27.4 21.3 58,217 29.7 $1,216 20.5
$1500 to 1999 4.8 5.3 9,847 5.0 $1,730 4.9
$2000 to 2499 5.6 7.7 11,599 5.9 $2,149 7.2
$2500 to 2999 2.2 3.8 6,230 3.2 $2,693 4.9
$3000 to 3999 3.8 8.3 9,735 5.0 $3,387 9.5
$4000 to 4999 2.7 7.6 5,619 2.9 $4,444 7.2
$5000 to 5999 1.6 5.6 3,909 2.0 $5,368 6.1
$6000 to 7499 1.2 5.1 2,776 1.4 $6,673 5.4
$7500 to 9999 0.9 4.9 2,111 1.1 $8,595 5.3
$10,000 to 14,999 0.6 4.8 1,498 0.8 $11,997 5.2
$15,000 to 19,999 0.2 2.4 497 0.3 $17,160 2.5
$20,000 to 24,999 0.2 2.4 620 0.3 $23,024 4.1
$25,000 to 29,999 0.1 1.9 258 0.1 $27,059 2.0
$30,000 to 39,999 0.1 2.0 191 0.1 $33,895 1.9
$40,000 to 49,999 0.0 1.1 66 0.0 $44,011 0.8
$50,000 to 59,999 0.0 0.6 22 0.0 $53,854 0.3
$60,000 to 69,999 0.0 0.3 13 0.0 $63,515 0.2
$70,000 + 0.0 0.3 9 0.0 $87,387 0.2
As did Table 2.8, Table 2.9 gives us a more detailed picture for our patient population's 
1999 spending by diagnostic cost group according to their chronic conditions. Again 
other unpredicted injuries and disease will not be take into consideration.
PraspecS^B ©CtSS 64©daS, Predicting 1999
Benchmark Cu&re&it Samp e
ADCG Expenditure 
Range
% Total R ill RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8
Total 100 100 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
$0 to $999 48.4 42.2 9 27.5 41.9 58.3 41.8 42.9 44.3 28.1
$1000 to 4999 46.6 51.7 64.1 52.4 38.0 51.5 49.6 50.6 63.3
$5000 to 9999 3.7 4.5 0.3 5.9 4.3 2.7 4.9 5.9 3.9 6.4
$10,000 to 24,999 1.0 1.3 0.4 2.0 1.2 0.8 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.9
$25,000 or more 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
Table 2.10 shows the CareGroup 8 hospital’s patient population's spending distribution. 
This table can help the hospital administrators to set a rough budget for 1999 according to 
the chronic conditions of their current populations without taking into new patients and 
unpredicted disease and injuries into consideration.
Re-calibration by Service Category
Since CareGroup would also want to evaluate how much a new normalization affects 
things, and make a decision about whether to use the single relative cost factor 
(PRED31c) or use recalibrated ones, the intent was to focus on simple adjustments, and 
use perhaps only a linear model.
After some thought, I found out that it is much better to use the DCG categorical 
variables for recalibration instead of doing the linear model a + b*pred31c that was 
initially prepared. The reason is that the linear model will most likely make negative 
predictions for lots of people, and this is a big problem if it is to be used in a denominator
for normalizing. So we decided to use a Generalized Linear Model, with DCG31c as a 
class variable. Our databases have enough observations to do this.
This normalization works well only if the risk score is not too close to zero to create a 
normalized value of the variable being predicted for each person. So instead of 
normalizing each person alone, we normalize it for groups. Hence for each doctor or 
practice groups or hospitals are as follows:
Adjusted average spending  -  (mm o f actual costs)/(sum o f normalized risk scores)
This will be better than using
Average adjusted spending = sum o f  (actual costs/(normalized risk score))
The first variable is much more stable with respect to outliers. The following figure 
shows us the recalibrated predicted result for service categories by cost groups which 
proves how well the single model performs:
Figure 2.2 Predicated cost estimate by recaliberating category:
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After running the recalibration program based on the data we have, the model fits the 
three services well. The coefficients were generally monotonic, and did well over most 
of the DCGs with the exception of the very highest values where there just are not enough 
people to predict spending reliably. It would be also helpful to know how well the model 
also does in predicting the total spending, not just the three components, since this 
provides a nice benchmark.
There are some pros and cons for this recalibrations. The pros are: The main thing that 
this recalibration buys us is a better fit at the tails, reflecting better the nonlinear pattern 
of low costs for most, and very high predicted costs for a few. Possibly this impresses 
our clinicians. The second argument in favor is that the model might do better on smaller 
panel sizes. The comparisons that I have done so far are for panels with several thousand 
patients. The nonlinearities would not be expected to affect the means when averages of 
this size are computed. The third argument in favor is that doctors seeing the method 
might PREFER a more complicated to a simpler model since it may have more clinical 
credibility. The complicated model will provide more targeted predictions toward certain 
service categories, which is comparing apples to apples.
The cons are that the recalibrated models are rather complicated and tedious and it does 
not seem credible that all costs simply grow in the same proportion.
However, since the recalibrated models have proved that the single model performs very 
well in predicting for each specific category, for simplifying purposes, we decided to use 
the single model score as the multiplier.
Cornell $i©oii© fro fh© Gas® M ©1
A variety of methodological issues are raised when developing or interpreting provider 
profiles that compare patient outcomes. In most instances, conclusions must be drawn 
tentatively due to small sample sizes and the difficulty of adjusting adequately for patient 
risk. Despite these challenges, however, profiles are increasingly generated around the 
country and are used as an important tool in ensuring healthcare "value" - a  melding of 
cost and quality.
We believe that comparing patient outcomes across providers is valuable, but much 
depends on how the profiles are used. Given the state of the art, it is inappropriate to use 
such profiles alone to make "all or nothing" business decisions: for example, telling an 
"outliner" provider that unless their profile rating improves, business will be withdrawn. 
In this context, profiles are likely to generate criticism —often based on well-founded 
methodological concerns— and heighten adversarial relationships among providers, 
payers, and policymakers. Similarly, if such profiles are disseminated to a public 
unaware of the need to draw conclusions tentatively, further controversy will likely 
follow, impeding opportunities for productive dialogue and improvements. If profiles are
released to providers without appropriate education about how to use them to identify 
areas for improvement, they are likely to be ignored.
Profiles comparing patient outcomes are most valuable in an environment of cooperation 
and collaboration, with incentives for learning and improvement.
IIL Conclusion
Many projects I was involved in involving data mining and modeling are like most of the 
initial programs to compare provider performance focused on hospitalizations, examining 
mortality, Length of Stay, and charges. While these are clearly important outcomes, they 
are fairly limited, especially from many consumers' perspectives—death is not an 
immediate prospect for most persons, and the public may be more interested in functional 
outcomes or quality of life. In addition, most persons, particularly those of working age, 
are not hospitalized during a given year. Outcomes relating to outpatient and preventive 
services are therefore more applicable to their concerns. Especially as managed care 
increasingly constricts the reimbursable services available to consumers, the burden of 
proof about quality shifts somewhat from the provider alone to encompass the health plan 
as well. This is the reason I choose to talk about Physician profiles with Risk Adjustment 
from the patients’ claims diagnosis files. This kind of study will be very helpful to 
hospital executives, payers and working-class patients. The social and economic value of 
these kinds of studies should never be underestimated.
There are many limitations for such studies, such as different views of stakeholders, 
concerns about the risk-adjustment methodology, incomplete data, small sample size, 
limited study length, confidentiality issues, side effects, etc.
In this study, one of the most troubling consequences of publishing the report cards— 
especially byindividual doctor —is the possibility that providers will avoid high-risk 
patients. These patients are, by definition, more likely to suffer bad outcomes, thereby 
potentially decreasing their provider's performance. Thus, besides doing these profiles, 
methods must be figured out to encourage doctors to accept sicker patients and at the 
same time to provide more efficient and effective care to all the patients. This is a 
question to all healthcare economics researchers, hospital administrators, stakeholders, 
payers as well as the providers and patients themselves.
F/o P©Ifcy Implfcak©ms
Change in our healthcare system is increasingly fragmented into diverse regional 
marketplaces Locally, competition is fierce among health plans and providers, with 
constant jockeying measurement efforts, including comparisons of outcomes using 
various risk-adjustment methodologies. A bewildering array of reports is produced, even 
in neighboring cities. For example, in the case study of this paper, we use the DxCG 
methodology, which has been used by HCFA (Health Care Financial Administration). In 
Ohio alone, Cleveland uses its own, home-grown risk adjustment (developed by Michael 
Pine & Associates); Cincinnati uses Iameter's AIM; and the Dayton employer coalition 
chose MedStat's Disease Staging .5
Without common methods, comparisons are meaningless. Calls are therefore increasing 
for national standards to enhance the consistency of quality measures and permit 
comparisons across regions. As a representative of a midsize manufacturing firm 
asserted, " The government should prescribe some standards and force providers to 
adhere to these standards in the publishing of information. The government should say, 
'You're going to code this disease this way, and you do it consistently and uniformly'".6
5 Vema, G. 1996. "Dayton Hospitals Link to Perform Cost Study." Cincinnati Business Courier 13(4):8C
6 United States General Accounting Office; Health, Education, and Human Services Division (USGAO), 
1995. Employers and Individual Consumers Want Additional Information on Quality. (GAO/HEHS-95- 
201) Washington, D.C.
Nonetheless, experience suggests that local stakeholders in different marketplaces do 
differ in their-interests and emphasis. Achieving a balance between standardizing 
measures to facilitate widespread comparisons and customizing measures to address local 
needs the current challenge.
However, even in regions with longer experience in this endeavor, two questions remain 
unanswered: what do risk-adjusted outcomes (mostly mortality rates) mean about the 
quality of care; and what is the aggregate effect of these initiatives on total healthcare 
costs? As the GAO observed, the staples of most hospital reports (mortality and length of 
stay)" are considered too narrow to truly reflect quality".7 "Some of the cost savings 
employers attribute to efficiency improvements in inpatient hospital care are partially 
offset by higher expenditures for ambulatory care".8 This situation has not stopped 
purchasers from using report-card findings. Nonetheless, it heightens concerns about 
balancing reservations about the actual implications of most risk-adjusted outcome 
information. Harvard Medical School Professor Dr. Lisa Iezzoni suggests several factors 
that must be addressed: "First, the participants in this activity should understand that they 
are jointly entering a large, applied experiment. In an experiment —as opposed to an 
endeavor using well accepted, rigorous methods with clearly understood benefits— 
evaluation is critical. If providers and business coalitions jointly recognize the
7 United States General Accounting Office; Health, Education, and Human Services Division (USGAO), 
1994. Employers Urge Hospitals to Battle Costs Using Performance Data Systems. (GAO/HEHS-95-1) 
Washington, D.C. (p i2).
8 United States General Accounting Office; Health, Education, and Human Services Division (USGAO), 
1994. Employers Urge Hospitals to Battle Costs Using Performance Data Systems.. (GAO/HEHS-95-1) 
Washington, D.C. (p9).
experimental nature of their undertaking, tensions between the two groups may lessen. It 
also would allow them to unify around the common objective of learning the value of 
severity-derived data for interpreting hospital cost and quality figures.
Second, the participants in the discourse about severity-derived information must 
understand better the goals and concerns of the other sides. Providers could learn more 
about the desire of local businesses to quantify hospital quality, permitting more prudent, 
better-informed decisions—purchasers reasonably no longer accept vague promises about 
quality monitoring, without concrete evidence of its results. In turn, business leaders 
could explore the legitimate reservations of providers about the limitations of severity 
data and the outcomes that are being studied Providers need to be intimately involved in 
selecting the risk adjusters, to ensure—at a minimum — face validity. By working in 
concert, the common goal of improving quality and efficiency may be achieved.
Third, given the uncertainty surrounding interpretation of much of these data, it is 
important to weigh what actions may reasonably be founded on the information.
Fourth, in times of increasingly constrained resources, concerns about costs and trade-off 
inevitably arise.
Finally, the Institute of Medicine observed: 'The public interest is materially served when 
society is given as much information on costs, quality, and value for healthcare dollar
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expended as can be given accurately and provided with educational materials that aid 
interpretation of the at information. Public disclosure is acceptable only when it: (1) 
involves information and analytic results that come from studies that have been well 
conducted, (2) is based on data that can be shown to be reliable and valid for the purposes 
intended, and (3) is accompanied by appropriate educational material.'"9
Thus, to provide efficient and effective care of people and the study of it will be a long­
term task for all of us.
9 Donaldson, M.S., and K.N.Lohr. 1994, Health Data in the Information Age. Use, Disclosure, and 
Privacy. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
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